We present a new framework for proving fully black-box separations and lower bounds. We prove a general theorem that facilitates the proofs of fully black-box lower bounds from a one-way function (OWF).
Introduction

Cryptographic Primitives and Black-Box Constructions
An important question in complexity-based cryptography is understanding which cryptographic primitives (e.g., one-way functions, pseudo-random generators) are implied by others. In principle, an implication between two primitives can be proved as a logical statement (e.g., the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of pseudo-random generators). However, most proofs of such implications (with very few exceptions, e.g., [Bar01] ) are in fact so-called fully black-box constructions.
Informally, a black-box construction of a primitive Q from a primitive P is a pair of algorithms, called construction and reduction, such that the construction, using only the functionality of P, implements Q and the reduction, using only the functionality of P and the one of a potential breaker algorithm, breaks P whenever the breaker algorithm breaks Q. As a corollary, such a black-box construction establishes that the existence of P implies the existence of Q.
One of many such examples is the construction of a one-way function from a weak one-way function [Yao82] .
After futile attempts to prove that the existence of one-way functions implies that of key agreement, Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] proved the first black-box separation result: They showed that there is no fully black-box construction of key agreement from one-way functions. Their seminal work inspired a plethora of similar results and nowadays one identifies two main types of black-box separation results: black-box separations of a primitive Q from a primitive P and lower bounds on some complexity parameter (e.g., seed length, number of calls to the underlying primitive, etc.) in the construction of Q from P. Besides [IR89] , the work of Simon [Sim98] , where he shows that there is no fully black-box construction of a collision-resistant hash function from a one-way function, is an example of the former. As an example of the latter, Kim et. al. [KST99] established a lower bound of Ω( k/ log(n)) on the number of queries of any construction of a universal one-way hash function that compresses k bits from a one-way permutation on n bits. This was later improved by Gennaro et. al. [GGKT05] to Ω(k/ log(n)).
Reingold et. al. [RTV04] were the first to formalize a model for and study the relations between different notions of "black-boxness" of cryptographic constructions.
A key property of a fully black-box construction of Q from P is the requirement that it constructs Q efficiently even when given black-box access to a non-efficient implementation of P. A proof technique utilizing this property, which is implicit in many black-box separations, involves an (inefficient) oracle instantiation of the primitive P and an appropriate (inefficient) breaker oracle B. The separation is usually proved by showing that B breaks the security of the candidate construction for Q, but at the same time no efficient oracle algorithm that has blackbox oracle access to both the breaker and the primitive (in particular, the potential reduction) breaks the security property of the underlying instantiation of P.
In [HR04] , Hsiao and Reyzin introduce the "two-oracle" paradigm, referring to the oracle implementations of P and the breaker B. The separation in [MM11] also makes explicit use of this paradigm.
Our Contribution
In constructions based on one-way functions (or permutations), i.e., when P = OWF, the oracle that implements OWF is usually set to be a random permutation, which is one-way with very high probability even in the presence of a non-uniform algorithm. On the other hand, the proof that the breaker algorithm for the constructed primitive Q does not help invert the permutation is repeated in an "ad-hoc" manner in many separation proofs, e.g., in [Sim98, HHRS07] and also in a recent result on lower bounds on the number of calls made by any construction of a pseudo-random generator from a one-way function [HS12] .
Thus, while in many separation proofs the task of finding the right breaker oracle is different (this is inherent, as each time it is required to break the security of a different primitive), we observe that the proof that it does not help in inverting the underlying one-way function can be facilitated and unified to a large extent. To that end, we prove a general theorem that facilitates the proof of black-box separations (Theorem 18). In particular, we show that any circuit with access to an oracle that satisfies two local properties, does not help to invert many functions.
Our framework allows proving separation results that exclude the existence of reductions with very weak security requirements. In this work we focus on the important case where the black-box construction is so-called fixed-parameter. That is, for a security parameter ρ, both the construction algorithm and the reduction access the primitive and breaker of security ρ only. All black-box constructions found in the literature are in fact fixed-parameter constructions. We believe that adapting the approach of [HS12] , it is possible to extend our results to the most general case.
Our proof uses the encoding technique from [GGKT05] , which was already adapted to the special cases in [HHRS07] and [HS12] . We also use the bending technique that originated in [Sim98] and was subsequently used in [HH09] and [HS12] .
As an application, in Section 4 we prove a lower bound of Ω(n/ log 3 (n)) on the number of calls made by any fully black-box construction of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) from a one-way function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . The bound is improved in Section 5 to Ω(n/ log(n)), which matches the construction from [BM12] .
UOWHFs are a fundamental cryptographic primitive, most notably used for obtaining digital signatures. They were studied extensively since their introduction by Naor and Yung [NY89] , who showed a simple construction that makes only one call to the underlying one-way function whenever, additionally, the function is a permutation. Rompel [Rom90] showed a construction based on any one-way function, and the most efficient construction based on general one-way functions is due to Haitner et. al. [HHR + 10]. Their construction makesÕ(n 6 ) calls to a one-way function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Note that the bound given in [GGKT05] does not say anything for the mere construction of a UOWHF (e.g., for a function which compresses one bit), and prior to our work it would have been possible to conjecture that there exists a construction of a UOWHF from a general one-way function that makes only one call to the underlying one-way function. Our bound matches exactly and up to a log-factor the number of calls made by the constructions of [BM12] and [?], respectively.
Our result can be understood as an analog to that of Holenstein and Sinha, who show a bound of Ω(n/ log(n)) on the number of calls to a one-way function that are made by a construction of a pseudo-random generator. We observe (details are omitted) that the recent result of [HS12] can be explained in out framework. Our characterization of UOWHFs (presented in Section 4.1) is inspired by their characterization of pseudo-random generators. For some candidate constructions, our proof also utilizes their BreakOW oracle. Our main technical contribution in Section 4.2 is the oracle BreakPI and the proof that it satisfies the conditions of our theorem from Section 3.
Preliminaries
The Computational Model
A function p = p(ρ) is polynomial if there exists a value c such that p(ρ) = ρ c . A machine M is efficient if there exists a polynomial p such that on every input x ∈ {0, 1} * , M (x) halts after at most p(|x|) steps. A function s : N + → N + is a security function if for every ρ ∈ N + it holds that s(ρ + 1) ≥ s(ρ), and s is efficiently computable (i.e., there exists an efficient machine M that on input 1 ρ outputs s(ρ)). For a security function s we define
for all large enough ρ. A boolean circuit A : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m is a directed acyclic graph in which every node (called gate) is either an input node of in-degree 0 labeled as one of the m input bits, an output node labeled by one of the m output bits, an AND gate, an OR or a NOT gate. A circuit A implements the function f : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m that corresponds to its evaluation on its inputs. The converse also holds: For every function f : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m it is always possible to define canonically 1 a circuit A that implements f .
Let n, n ∈ N + . An (n, n )-oracle circuit C (?) is a circuit that additionally has special "oracle" gates, each having in-degree n and out-degree n . A circuit C (?) is an oracle circuit if it is an (l, l )-oracle circuit for some l, l ∈ N + . Let C (?) be an (n, n )-oracle circuit and let A be a circuit with n input gates and n output gates (in this case we say that A is compatible with C (?) ). The circuit C (A) is defined as the circuit C (?) where each oracle gate is substituted by a copy A. For a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n define C (f ) as the circuit C (?) where each oracle gate is substituted by a copy of the canonical circuit that evaluates f . Similarly, let n 1 , n 1 , n 2 , n 2 ∈ N + . An (n 1 , n 1 , n 2 , n 2 )-two oracle circuit C (?,?) is a circuit that has two types of oracle gates, where a gate of the first type has n 1 inputs and n 1 outputs and a gate of the second type has n 2 inputs and n 2 outputs. As before, for compatible functions and circuits that evaluate compatible functions f 1 : {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 1 and f 2 : {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} n 2 the circuit C (f 1 ,f 2 ) is defined similarly.
A non-uniform algorithm A = {A ρ } ρ∈N + is a parameterized family of circuits A ρ . A nonuniform algorithm A implements the parametrized functions family f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + , if each A ρ implements f ρ .
A non-uniform oracle algorithm A (?) = {A (?) ρ } ρ∈N + is a parameterized family of oracle circuits. For an oracle algorithm A (?) and a family of functions f we define
whenever for every ρ the function is compatible with the oracle-circuit.
Uniform generation of oracle algorithms.
The construction and reduction algorithms in fully black-box constructions are assumed to work for any 2 input/output lengths of the primitive and breaker functionalities, and therefore are modeled in the following way: In addition to the security parameter ρ, both the construction and the reduction algorithms take as input information about the input/output lengths of the underlying primitive f ρ and the breaker algorithm B ρ . A uniform oracle algorithm is a machine M that on input M (1 ρ , n(ρ), n (ρ)) outputs an (n(ρ), n (ρ))-oracle circuit A (?) ρ . For a uniform oracle algorithm M and a parameterized family of functions f = {f ρ : {0,
. For a non-uniform algorithm A, the family M (A) is defined analogously. Let s = s(ρ) be a security function. An s-non-uniform two oracle algorithm is a machine M such that for every ρ, n 1 , n 1 , n 2 , n 2 ∈ N + and every a ∈ {0, 1} s(ρ) , it holds that M (1 ρ , n 1 , n 1 , n 2 , n 2 , a) outputs an (n 1 , n 1 , n 2 , n 2 )-two oracle circuit A (?,?) ρ,a with at most s(ρ) oracle gates. Note that the last requirement is essential and is implicit in the case of an efficient uniform oracle algorithm, where the number of oracle gates is bounded by the polynomial that bounds the running time of the algorithm. For an s-non-uniform two oracle algorithm M , a non-uniform algorithm B and a family of functions f , we formally define
Modeling Cryptographic Primitives
In order to state our results in their full generality, and in particular to exclude reductions that are allowed to use non-uniformity and are considered successful in inverting the one-way function even if they invert only a negligible fraction of the inputs of the function, the following two definitions are very general, and extend Definitions 2.1 and 2.3 from [RTV04] . The example of modeling a one-way function follows the definition.
Definition 1 (Cryptographic Primitive). A primitive Q is a pair F Q , R Q , where F Q is a set of parametrized families of functions f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + and R Q is a relation over triplets f ρ , C, of a function f ρ ∈ f (for some f ∈ F Q ), a circuit C and a number > 0. We define that C (Q, )-breaks f ρ if and only if f ρ , C, ∈ R Q .
The set F Q specifies all the correct implementations (not necessarily efficient) of Q and the relation R Q captures the security property of Q, that is, it specifies for every concrete security parameter implementation, how well a breaker algorithm performs with respect to the security property of the primitive.
Finally, let s = s(ρ) be a security function, B = {B ρ } ρ∈N + be a non-uniform algorithm, and f ∈ F Q . We say that B (Q, 
The usual notion of polynomial security of a primitive is captured by the following definition:
A primitive Q exists if there exists an efficient uniform algorithm M that implements an f ∈ F Q , and for every efficient uniform algorithm M that, on input 1 ρ outputs a circuit, it holds that {M (1 ρ )} ρ∈N + does not Q-break f .
Observe that the requirement that M outputs a circuit is made without loss of generality and captures the standard definition of an efficient randomized machine M that breaks a primitive. Given such an M that tosses at most r = r(ρ) random coins, there exists 3 a (now deterministic) efficient uniform machine M that on input 1 ρ outputs a circuit C ρ with m(ρ) + r(ρ) input gates and n(ρ) output gates that computes the output of M for all strings of length m(ρ), and therefore Q-breaks the primitive.
One-Way Functions
Our model for describing a primitive is very general and captures the security properties of many cryptographic primitives. As an example, we bring a standard definition of a one-way function and then explain how it can be described in our model. Definition 2 (One-Way Function). A one-way function f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + is an efficiently uniformly computable family of functions f ρ : {0, 1} n(ρ) → {0, 1} m(ρ) , such that for every efficient randomized machine A, the function that maps ρ to
is negligible.
In order to model a one-way function (OWF), we set f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + ∈ F OWF , where f ρ : {0, 1} n(ρ) → {0, 1} m(ρ) , if and only if n = n(ρ) and m = m(ρ) are polynomial security functions. We say that F OWF contains a collection of sets of functions F = {F ρ } ρ∈N + , if for every family f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + , where f ρ ∈ F ρ for every ρ, it holds that f ∈ F OWF .
In this case, for a function f ρ ∈ f ∈ F OWF , a circuit C that inverts f ρ on an -fraction of its inputs, and > 0, set f, C, ∈ R OWF if and only if ≥ . The definition is general, and allows for the circuit C to implicitly use randomness. In such a case, for f ρ as before, a circuit with C with m(ρ) + r(ρ) input bits that computes an output x ∈ {0, 1} n(ρ) , and a value > 0, define f ρ , C, ∈ R OWF if and only if ≥ , where is the probability over uniform z ∈ {0, 1} r(ρ) and x ∈ {0, 1} n(ρ) that C(f ρ (x), z) outputs an x ∈ f −1 ρ (f ρ (x)).
Fully Black-Box Cryptographic Constructions
Finally, we bring the standard definition of a fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of a primitive Q from a primitive P, which is usually implicit in the literature. The construction algorithm G is an efficient uniform oracle algorithm and the security reduction R is an efficient uniform two-oracle algorithm. For every security parameter ρ and a function
ρ such that {g (fρ) ρ } ρ∈N + implements Q. The reduction algorithm works as follows: For a security parameter ρ and f as before, and additionally a breaker circuit B : {0, 1} b(ρ) → {0, 1} b (ρ) , the reduction R on input (1 ρ , n, n , b, b ) outputs an (n, n , b, b )-two-oracle circuit R (?,?) ρ . The security property property requires that indeed the series of circuits {R (Bρ,fρ) ρ } ρ∈N + P-breaks f . We emphasize that the vast majority (if not all) of the constructions of primitives from a one-way function found in the literature are in fact fixed-parameter fully black-box constructions. Formally:
Definition 3 (fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of Q from P). An efficient uniform oracle algorithm G and an efficient uniform two oracle algorithm R are a fixed-parameter fully-BB construction of a primitive Q = F Q , R Q from a primitive P = F P , R P if for every f ∈ F P :
For a super-polynomial security function s = s(ρ) (e.g., s(ρ) = 2 √ ρ ), the following definition of a fully black-box construction is significantly weaker than the standard one in the following three aspects: First, it requires that reduction only mildly breaks the one-way property of the function f (whenever the breaker breaks the constructed primitive in the standard polynomial sense). Second, the reduction algorithm does not have to be efficient or uniform (but the nonuniformity is limited to an advice of length s). Lastly, it allows the reduction to make s calls to its oracles 4 .
Definition 4 (s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of Q from P). A uniform oracle algorithm G and an s-non-uniform two oracle algorithm R are an s-weak fixed-parameter fully-BB construction of a primitive Q = F Q , R Q from a primitive P = F P , R P if for every f ∈ F P :
Random Permutations and Regular Functions
Let n and i be two integers such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n by P n . Let X , Y be sets. We denote by (X → Y) the set of all functions from X to Y.
}| is constant for all x ∈ X . A family of functions f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + is a regular function if for every ρ the function f ρ is regular. We denote by R n,i the set of all regular functions from {0, 1} n to itself such that the image of f contains 2 i values. E.g., R n,n = P n is the set of all permutations, and R n,0 is the set of all constant functions.
Bending a Function and Image Adaptation
It will be useful for us to compare the run of a circuit with oracle access to a function f to a run that is identical except that the output of one specific value is altered. For a fixed function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and y , y ∈ {0, 1} n , set
Similarly, for two fixed functions f, f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a set S ⊂ {0, 1} n , we define the image adaptation 5 of f to f on S to be the function
3 A General Theorem for Proving Strong Black-Box Separations
Deterministic Parametrized Oracles and Local Sets
The following definition allows to model general parameterized oracles, that is, oracles that, for any function f from some set of functions and any q from some query domain, return a value a from some answer set. We observe that many of the oracles used for black-box separations found in the literature could be described in such a way. Let X , Y, D and R be sets. A deterministic parametrized oracle for a class of functions
We call f , D, and R the function parameter, the domain, and the range of the oracle, respectively.
Our first example of a deterministic parametrized oracle is the evaluation oracle E for functions on {0, 1} n , which on a query q returns the evaluation of f on q. In this case we have that
The next two definitions capture two important local properties of parametrized oracles. We believe that they are natural and observe that many of the oracles devised for separation results satisfy them.
Intuitively, a determining set is an indexed collection of sets that determine the output of the oracle for every function f and query q in the following sense: If for two functions f and f it holds that their corresponding oracle outputs differ for some q, then for one of them (f or f ) it holds that the local change of an image adaptation of one of the functions to agree with that of the other on its determining set changes the output of the oracle. Formally:
,q∈D of subsets of X , such that for every f, f ∈ F and every query q ∈ D:
In the example of the evaluation oracle, we observe that it has a 1-determining set. Indeed, setting I E f,q def = {q} satisfies the required definition, since if for any f, f ∈ {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and x ∈ {0, 1} n for which
Consider an oracle O with a determining set I O for some class of permutations F. Fix f, f ∈ F and q ∈ D. The following two propositions are immediate from the definition of determining sets:
f ,q (in this case we say that f agrees with f ' on I O f ,q ), then adapting f to agree with f on I O f,q changes O f (q).
(in this case we say that the functions agree on their determining sets), then
Proposition 7 establishes that determining sets indeed determine the output of the oracle in the following sense: If we know the value O f (q) for a query q and a function f , and, moreover, we know that functions f , f agree on their determining sets for q, then this information already determines for us the value O f (q).
The next local property of an oracle captures the fact that it is in some sense "stable". For a function f and query q as before, and a value y in the image set of f , a bending set for f, q, and y is a set of all potentially "sensitive" y values: For any value y which is not in the image of f on its determining set, and for any value y which is not in the bending set, the oracle's answer to query q does not change for the local adaptations of f from y to y. That is, it holds that O f (y ,y) (q) = O f (q). Formally:
,y∈Y of subsets of Y, such that for every function f ∈ F, query q ∈ D, for every target image y ∈ Y, and for every source image y / ∈ B O f,q,y , it holds that O f (q) = O f (y ,y) (q). We say that B O is a t-bending set if for every function f ∈ F, query q ∈ D and y ∈ Y it holds that |B O f,q,y | ≤ t.
For the example of the evaluation oracle, we observe that it also has a 1-bending set. Setting B E f,q,y def = {f (q)} (for the relevant f, q and y) satisfies the required definition. Indeed, for any y = f (q) and y ∈ Y, it holds that
Finally, a deterministic parametrized algorithm O is t-stable for a class of functions F if there exist (I O , B O ) that are a t-determining set and a t-bending set for F, respectively, and at least one of them is not empty.
We note that determining and bending sets always exist unconditionally (just choose the entire domain and range of f , for every determining and bending set, respectively). The challange is finding an oracle that allows to break a primitive and at the same time is t-stable.
Exhaustive-search oracles.
We identify that all the parametrized oracles in the literature are in fact of a special type, which we call exhaustive-search oracles. We say that an oracle is an exhaustive-search oracle if there is an oracle circuit Φ (?) : D × R → {0, 1} (called a predicate) such that for every function f and query q the computation of O f (q) can be computed by a loop (according to an understood enumeration) over the values v ∈ R, where in each step the current value v is checked to satisfy a predicate Φ (f ) (q, v). If the predicate is satisfied, i.e., Φ (f ) (q, v) = 1, the algorithm outputs v, and if no such v exists it returns a special bottom value ⊥.
Formally, a deterministic parameterized oracle O is an exhaustive-search oracle if there exists Φ (as before) such that following algorithm outputs O f (q) for every function parameter f and every query q ∈ D:
Observe that the range of an exhaustive-search algorithm is the set R ∪ {⊥}. Of special interest are exhaustive-search oracles that make relatively few queries to their oracles (e.g., a polynomial number of queries). We note that most parameterized oracles in the literature are in fact of this type. The following lemma shows that an exhaustive-search oracle O : D → R ∪ {⊥} for which Φ makes t queries has a t-determining set.
Lemma 9. Let O be an exhaustive-search oracle with predicate Φ (?) : D × R → {0, 1} that makes t queries to its oracle. Denote by X (f ) Φ (q, v) the list of queries issued by the predicate during the evaluation of
where v last is the last value in the enumeration of R is a t-determining set for O.
The proof follows by inspection of the algorithm and the definition of determining sets.
Proof:
The bound on the size of the set is immediate and so we check that I O f,q is indeed a determining set. Suppose that for two functions f, f and a query q it holds that O f (q) = O f (q). It follows that for at least one of the functions, there is an iteration v for which the predicate Φ (f ) (q, v) holds (otherwise both return ⊥). W.l.o.g. assume that this happens for f , i.e., that O f (q) = v, and that v is the minimal of the returned values, i.e., that O f (q) = v , where either v > v or v = ⊥. Now, observe that after adapting f to agree with f on I O f,q = X Φ (f, q) it holds that with the adapted function oracle the predicate circuit returns v (or some value that appears in the enumeration before v), as the answer of the predicate depends only on the answers of the function to the query set.
The choice of v last (for the case O f (q) = ⊥) is somewhat arbitrary, but it will be useful for us to have the queries involved with q on some arbitrary evaluation of the predicate as part of the bending set. We note that this is not needed for the proof of the lemma.
A t-Stable Oracle O f Inverts Only a Few Functions
The next lemma, which first appeared in [GGKT05] and was subsequently adapted to many other separation results, e.g., [HHRS07, RS10, HS12] , establishes an information-theoretic bound on the number of functions an oracle-aided algorithm can invert from a set F if the oracle is t-stable for F. Essentially, it shows that given an oracle circuit A (?) with access to such an oracle O, it is possible to encode a function f ∈ F that A inverts well using significantly fewer bits than log(|F|), such that f can still be fully reconstructed, or equivallently, that the encoding is injective.
Lemma 10 (Encoding Lemma). Let A (?) be an oracle circuit making at most c calls to its oracle, and let O = {O f } f ∈{0,1} n →{0,1} n be a deterministic parameterized oracle such that for a class of permutations F ⊆ P n it is t-stable with sets
, of the permutations f in F, it holds that
The proof is a generalized version of the encoding technique of [GGKT05] .
Proof: We describe an injective canonical mapping from the set of all functions f ∈ F which A O f inverts well (i.e., inverts more than a 1 c -fraction of the inputs to f ) into a small set. Denote by Queries(A O f (y)) the list of at most c of queries made by A to O f during its computation on input y. Consider the following algorithm:
y := min y∈T 5.
S := S ∪ {y } 6.
Define the mapping M that maps every function f which A O f inverts well to a list of its action on f −1 (Y \S) as a list of pairs, i.e., f → x 1 , f (x 1 ), x 2 , f (x 2 ), . . . , x |Y\S| , f (x |Y\S| ) , where x 1 < x 2 < · · · < x |Y\S| . We show that M is injective. Suppose that for f 1 , f 2 ∈ F, A O f 1 and A O f 2 invert well f 1 and f 2 , respectively.
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that f 1 = f 2 . We first observe that both functions agree on the sets {y :
2 (y) }. This holds as these images are explicitly given by M(·) since they are in Y \ S. Therefore, there must be a value y, which they both invert, such that
Let y be the lexicographically first element for which (1) holds. Define x 1 def = A O f 1 (y) and
Proposition 12. For both f 1 and f 2 there is an iteration during the run of the algorithm Buildimage(f 1 ) (resp., Buildimage(f 2 )) during which y is added to S. 
Proof: Otherwise, we reach a contradiction to the assumption that M(f 1 ) = M(f 2 ) as the value of y is explicitly given by M.
Any difference in the computation of A O f 1 (y) and A O f 2 (y) may only stem from different answers to some oracle query. Let q be an oracle query on which the computations differ, that is, for a query q made in both computations and a 1 = a 2 ∈ R we have:
By Proposition 7 (for f 1 , f 2 and their corresponding determining sets I O ), we have that there exists a value x * ∈ I O f 1 ,q ∪ I O f 2 ,q for which
as otherwise, (2) cannot hold. The next two propositions yield that for such an
f 2 ,q ) it holds that f 1 (x * ) = y (resp., f 2 (x * ) = y). In particular, combining this with Equation (3) and the fact that f 1 and f 2 are permutations asserts that in each of the sets I O f 1 ,q and I O f 2 ,q there is at most one such x * . Let us assume that x * ∈ I O f 1 ,q .
Proposition 13. It holds that y 1 ≤ y.
Proof:
Assuming otherwise (that y 1 > y), consider the execution of the algorithm Buildimage(f 1 ). In such a case, recall that by Proposition 12 y is added to the set S, and in line (6) of the algorithm y 1 is added to R (as it is in the image of the determining set for query q). Subsequently, in line (9) y 1 is removed from T . Since at this point of the execution of Bulidimage(f 1 ) y 1 is not in S, it is never added to S, hence M(f 1 ) contains (x * , y 1 ), which contradicts M(f 1 ) = M(f 2 ). Proposition 14. It holds that y 1 ≥ y and y 2 ≥ y.
Proof: We prove that y 1 ≥ y and observe that the proof for y 2 ≥ y follows from symmetry. Assuming otherwise (that y 1 < y), we consider two cases: If (x * , y 1 ) appears in M(f 1 ) or (f −1 2 (y 1 ), y 1 ) appears in M(f 2 ), then since both are permutations, combining with (3) we reach
2 (y 1 ) must hold, and moreover y 1 is added to S at each of the corresponding Buildimage runs. Observe now that this contradicts the minimality of y.
It follows that: For any element x in I O f 1 ,q ∪I O f 2 ,q on which f 2 and f 1 do not agree it holds that f 1 (x) = y if x ∈ I O f 1 ,q and that f 2 (x) = y if x ∈ I O f 2 ,q . Moreover, since f 1 , f 2 are permutations, we know that there is at most one such element in each of the sets, and in at least one of them such an element exists.
Next, if there exists exactly one such element, then, as before, without loss of generality we assume that there exists x * ∈ I O f 1 ,q for which f 1 (x * ) = y. If there are two elements, i.e., x * ∈ I O f 1 ,q and x * * ∈ I O f 2 ,q , then by the definition of determining sets we know that adapting one of the functions to agree with the other changes the value of the oracle on it.
In both cases we get that (without loss of generality) we may assume that adapting f 2 to agree with f 1 on I O f 1 ,q changes O f 2 (q). Recall that if there is exactly one such element, this follows from Proposition 6. Now, note that the image adaptation of f 2 to f 1 on I O f 1 ,q is just f 2(y 2 ,y) and therefore O f 2(y 2 ,y) (q) = O f 2 (q), and by defintion of the bending sets it must hold that y 2 = f 2 (x * ) ∈ B O f 2 ,q,y . Observe that at step (4) of the execution of Buildimage(f 2 ), after y is set to y from T , in line (7) y 2 is added to R (by the definition of the determining sets and in line (9) y 2 is removed from T . Propositions 13 and 14 establish that y 2 > y = y 1 . Therefore, at this point of the execution y 2 is not in S and hence never added to S. Finally, this means that (x * , y 2 ) appears in M(f 2 ) which contradicts M(f 1 ) = M(f 2 ).
Claim 15. The set S generated by the algorithm Buildimage(f ) contains at least b elements. Observe that during each iteration of the algorithm one element is added to S and at most (c · t + c · t + 1) elements are removed from T , where the first two summands correspond the size of the relevant bending set and determining set for each of the c potential calls to the oracle, and the third to the element y (lines 6 -9 in the algorithm). It follows that when the algorithm terminates, the set S contains at least
We note that it is possible to encode M(f ) by describing the set S, the set Y \ f (S), and an ordering on the set Y \ f (S), which by what we have shown has size at most 2 n − b. Therefore, the size of the range of the mapping M is at most Our next goal is to extend the encoding lemma to the case where F ⊆ R n,i . We observe that the following process, which consists of 3 independent random choices, samples a uniform random f from from R n,i :
1. Partition of the domain: Sample a random uniform partition P of the domain into subsets of size 2 n−i . The partition P is chosen in an unordered manner, and then we use some order relation 6 φ on all the subsets of size 2 n−i . For x ∈ P i , where P i ∈ P , we define
Figure 2: Decomposition of a regular function f : π P is a regular function onto {0, 1} i induced by a partition P of {0, 1} n , h is a permutation on {0, 1} i , and r I is injective from {0, 1} i into I.
π P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} i by π P (x) as the order function of P i in P according to φ 7 .
2. A permutation on {0, 1} i : Sample a random permutation h from P i .
3. Image determination: Sample a set I ⊂ {0, 1} n of size 2 i and set r I : {0, 1} i → {0, 1} n as the inverse function of the lexicographical order function 8 of I.
Indeed, the reader can verify that the mapping (P, h, I) → r I • h • π P is an injective function onto R n,i . In particular, it holds that |R n,i | =
, where the factors in the product correspond to the number of partitions of {0, 1} n to sets of size 2 i , the number of permutations on {0, 1} i and the number of subsets of size 2 n−i from {0, 1} n , respectively.
For a fixed P and I (of the matching size), we denote by R n,i (P, I) the subset of R n,i with partition P and image set I. The sampling process establishes a natural bijection f : P i → R n,i (P, I), where f [h] def = r I •h•π P . Similarly, we denote the inverse transformation by h[f ]. We extend the definition of f [h] to the entire set {0,
) is the set of all functions f on n bits with image set contained in I, such that if for x, x ∈ {0, 1} n it holds that π P (x) = π P (x ) then f (x) = f (x ). Therefore, it is not surprising that any oracle circuit A (?) with access to a t-stable deterministic parameterized oracle for a class of functions F ⊂ R n,i (P, I) does not invert many functions from F. This is formalized in the next lemma:
Lemma 16. Let n ≥ i ≥ 0, P be a fixed partition of {0, 1} n into subsets of size 2 n−i , and I ⊂ {0, 1} n an image set of size 2 i . Let A (?) be an oracle circuit making at most c calls to its oracle, and let O = {O f } f ∈F n,i (P,I) be a deterministic parameterized oracle such that for a class of functions F ⊆ R n,i (P, I) it is t-stable with sets (I O , B O ). Then for at most d i (c, t) of the functions f ∈ F, where d i is as 9 in Lemma 10, it holds that
The proof works by reduction to the setting of Lemma 10. To this end, we define a deterministic parameterized oracleÕ, a setF ⊂ P i of permutations with corresponding determining and bending sets, and show how to use A (?) to derive an algorithmÃ (?) that inverts many permutations fromF which contradicts Lemma 10.
7 Continuing the example, for the relation described in Footnote 6, we always have that for all x ∈ S, where S ∈ P contains the all zero string 0 n , that πP (x) is the all zero string 0 i . 8 Of course, any order relation would work just as well. 9 Note that here we substitute n for i.
Proof: Towards contradiction, let O be a deterministic parametrized oracle, where O f : D → R defined for all f ∈ {0, 1} n → I, such that for F ⊂ R n,i (P, I) it is t-stable with sets (I O , B O ), and A (?) an oracle circuit that inverts well (as before inverts well f means inverting at least a 1 c -fraction of the inputs to f ) more than d i functions from F.
We defineÕ = {Õ h } h∈{0,1} i →{0,1} i , a deterministic parameterized oracle, whereÕ h : D → R is given byÕ h (q)
f ∈ F}, and for every h ∈F, q ∈ D and every
,q,r I (y ) . By the construction, the definition of determining sets, bending sets and the definition of image adapting a function to agree with another function on a set, one can check that the new constructed sets are indeed determining sets and bending sets forÕ. Moreover, as r I is an injective function it holds that BÕ is a t-bending set forF. For every h ∈ {0, 1} i and q ∈ D it holds that
and so IÕ is a t-determining set 10 . Therefore, the oracle is t-stable forF. We construct a circuitÃ (?) such that for every function h ∈F and and every image y ∈ {0, 1} i it holds thatÃ (Õ h ) (y ) = h −1 (y ) whenever
). The circuitÃ stores the complete descriptions of π P and r I . On input y ∈ {0, 1} i it computes y def = r I (y ) and simulates the run of A (O f ) (y). Whenever in the simulation A issuses a query q to its oracle,Ã queries its oracle and uses the answer as an answer for the simulation. When the simulation terminates with output x = A(y),Ã outputs x = π P (x).
By the construction of the oracleÕ it follows thatÃ inverts well exactly the same number of functions as A, and so we reach a contradiction to Lemma 10.
We next show that any two oracle circuit making few queries to two deterministic parametrized oracles, where both oracles are t-stable for some set of functions F, does not invert well many functions from F.
Lemma 17. Let n ≥ i ≥ 0, P be a fixed partition of {0, 1} n into subsets of size 2 n−i , and I ⊂ {0, 1} n an image set of size 2 i . Let A (?,?) be an oracle circuit making a total number of at most c calls to its oracles, and let
f } f ∈F n,i (P,I) be deterministic parameterized oracles such that for a class of functions F ⊆ R n,i (P, I) both oracles are t-stable with sets (I O (0) , B O (0) ) and (I O (1) , B O (1) ), respectively. Then for at most d i (c, t) of the functions f ∈ F, where d i is as in Lemma 10, it holds that Pr x r ←{0,1} n A
The proof is straight forward and very similar to the proof of Lemma 16. We show how to reduce this case to the setting of Lemma 16. In this case we define a new parametrized oracleÕ f that on query
f (q). It follows readily thatÕ is t-stable. As before, any oracle circuit A (?,?) that inverts well more that d i functions from F when plugged with O (0) and O (1) can be used to construct a circuitÃ (?) that inverts well more than d i functions when plugged withÕ.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 18 (Black-Box Separation Factory). Let s = s(ρ) be a security function, and p = p(ρ) be a polynomial function. Let (G, A) = (G (?) , A (?,?) ) be a uniform oracle algorithm and an snon-uniform two-oracle algorithm, respectively. Let F = {F ρ } ρ>0 , where F ρ ⊂ R n(ρ),i(ρ) (P ρ , I ρ ), be contained in F OWF , and O = {O ρ } ρ>0 , where O ρ = {O ρ,f } f ∈F n(ρ),i(ρ) (Pρ,Iρ) , such that for all large enough ρ:
O ρ is t-stable with sets
is as in Lemma 10.
Then (G, A) is not an s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of Q from OWF.
Proof: Towards contradiction, assume that (G, R) is an s-non-uniform fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of Q from OWF. We explain how to construct a family of functions f that will be used to contradict the security assumption on our construction. As before, we set E ρ is the evaluation oracle for R n(ρ),i(ρ) , and recall that we have shown that E ρ is 1-stable for R n(ρ),i(ρ) . Combining this with the first condition and using Lemma 17 we have that for every fixed advice a ∈ {0, 1} s(ρ) , the two-oracle circuit R (?,?)
ρ,a inverts with probability greater than 1 s(ρ) at most d i (s(ρ), t) of the functions in F ρ . Therefore, by the union bound there are at most 2 s(ρ) ·d i (s(ρ), t) functions f ∈ F ρ , for which there exists an advice a, such that the circuit inverts more than a 1 s -fraction of the inputs to f . The condition on the size of F ρ gives a a function f ρ ∈ F ρ , such that for every a ∈ {0, 1} s(ρ) it holds that R
The first condition, which holds for all the functions in F ρ , gives that O ρ,fρ (Q,
Now, set f = {f ρ } ρ∈N + and B = {O ρ,f ρ } ρ∈N + . By the fact that F is contained in F OWF , we have that f ∈ F OWF . By our assumption on (R, G) it holds that G (f ) ∈ Q, and by what we have shown, it also holds that B Q-breaks G (f ) . Lastly, (again) by our construction of f , it holds that R [B,f ] does not (OWF, In this section we prove our second main result, namely a lower bound on the number of calls made by the construction algorithm G in any fully black-box construction (G, R) of UOWHF from OWF. Our bound is achieved by showing a sequence of efficient fixed-parameter fully black-box constructions, where each primitive is constructed from the one that precedes it, and by proving the lower bound on the number of calls a construction makes on the last primitive. A diagram of the reduction sequence is depicted in Figure 3 .
A Characterization of Universal One-Way Hash Functions
Loosely speaking, a universal one-way hash function is a keyed compressing function for which the probability that an adversary wins the following game is very small: First the adversary chooses a preimage v. Then a random key for the UOWHF is chosen. Finally, the adversary "wins" the game he finds a different preimage v that maps to the same value under the chosen key. Formally:
Definition 19 (UOWHF). A universal one-way hash function h = {h ρ } ρ∈N + is a family of uniformly efficiently computable keyed functions h ρ : {0, 1} κ(ρ) × {0, 1} m(ρ) → {0, 1} m (ρ) with m (ρ) < m(ρ) such that for any pair of efficient randomized algorithms (B 1 , B 2 ) the function mapping ρ to
is negligible. The family h is an -bit compressing UOWHF, where = (ρ), if m(ρ) − m (ρ) ≥ (ρ) for all large enough ρ.
The primitive UOWHF = (F UOWHF , R UOWHF ) is defined implicitly analogously to the way OWF was defined for one-way functions In this case, for every security parameter, the breaker (B 1 , B 2 ) can be modeled as one combined circuit that corresponds to the Cook-Levin encoding of their relevant circuits, with an extra input bit that determines which one is actually computed. Similarly, for every = (ρ) the primitive -UOWHF = F -UOWHF , R -UOWHF corresponds to -bit compressing universal one-way hash functions.
Domain extension of a UOWHF.
The definition of a UOWHF only guarantees that h ρ is compressing (i.e., it is possible that (ρ) = 1). The first reduction we use is a domain extension of a UOWHF, that allows to construct an -bit compressing UOWHF from a UOWHF. Shoup [Sho00] shows a fully-black box construction of a -bit compressing UOWHF from one that compresses only one bit, which is the minimal requirement from any UOWHF.
Lemma 20 (UOWHF domain extension).
There exists a fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of an -bit compressing UOWHF h ρ : {0, 1} log( )·κ(ρ) × {0, 1} m+ → {0, 1} m from a one-bit compressing UOWHF h ρ : {0, 1} κ(ρ) × {0, 1} m+1 → {0, 1} m . In order to evaluate h ρ the construction makes exactly (ρ) calls to h ρ . The security reduction R hρ,B ρ makes calls to its h ρ oracle, and exactly one call to the breaker B ρ = (B 1 , B 2 ) ρ oracle. Furthermore, if B ρ ( -UOWHF, )-breaks h ρ , then the reduction (UOWHF, )-breaks h ρ .
We observe that the security definition for UOWHFs involves an interaction, and allows the adversary to save its state using σ. It will be more convenient for us to work with an equivalent non-interactive version. The following definition of collision resistance is tightly related to that of a UOWHF by the lemma that follows it, where we denote by a b the concatenation of a and b.
Definition 21 (RP-CRHF).
A random preimage collision resistance hash function is an efficiently uniformly computable family of functions h ρ : {0, 1} m(ρ) → {0, 1} m (ρ) with m (ρ) < m(ρ), such that for every efficient randomized machine B the function mapping ρ to
is negligible. The family h is an -bit compressing RP-CRHF, where = (ρ), if additionally it holds that m(ρ) − m (ρ) ≥ (ρ) for all large enough ρ.
The primitives RP-CRHF and log 2 (ρ)-RP-CRHF are defined analogously.
Lemma 22 (UOWHF to RP-CRHF, folklore). Let h = {h ρ } ρ∈N + be a UOWHF. Then the
Proof: The security definition of an RP-CRHF is trivially implied by that of a UOWHF. Suppose that we have an breaker B ρ that finds a collision for a random preimage of h ρ (k v).
The reduction outputs the algorithms (B 1 , B 2 ) ρ as follows: B 1 is the algorithm that chooses a uniform random v ∈ {0, 1} m(ρ) . Upon receiving a random key k, the reduction B 2 returns B ρ (k v). It is immediate that (B 1 , B 2 ) ρ break the security of h as a UOWHF whenever B ρ breaks the security of h as a RP-CRHF.
In particular, we observe that the proof of the lemma implies the existence of a fixedparameter fully black-box construction of RP-CRHF from UOWHF that for every security parameter makes exactly one call to the universal one-way hash function. Additionally, the construction is security preserving in the strongest possible sense: If B ρ (RP-CRHF, )-breaks the constructed h ρ (i.e., returns a collision on a uniform input v with probability ) then it holds that the reduction (UOWHF, )-breaks the underlying h ρ . We mention that both the construction and the security reduction are uniform and efficient, and both make exactly one query to their oracles.
Pseudo-injective Functions.
Our last reduction establishes that padding the output of a log 2 (ρ)-RP-CRHF yields a primitive that is both a one-way function, and behaves like an injective function. A pseudo-injective function is an efficiently uniformly computable family g = {g ρ } ρ∈N + of length preserving functions g ρ : {0, 1} m(ρ) → {0, 1} m(ρ) such that for a uniformly chosen input v ∈ {0, 1} m(ρ) it is impossible to find another input v = v such that both map to the same value under g ρ . We stress that pseudo-injective functions exists unconditionally: Any permutation is a pseudo-injective function. Formally:
Definition 23 (Pseudo-Injectivity). A pseudo-injective function g = {g ρ } ρ∈N + is a uniformly efficiently computable family of functions g ρ : {0, 1} m(ρ) → {0, 1} m(ρ) , such that for all uniform efficient algorithms A the function mapping ρ to
Similarly to before, the primitive PI = F PI , R PI corresponds to a pseudo-injective function. Next, we consider the primitive OWF∧PI that corresponds to all functions which are both a one-way function and a pseudo-injective function. Formally, it holds that f ∈ F OWF∧PI if and only if f ∈ F OWF and f ∈ F PI . For a breaker circuit C, a function f ρ ∈ f ∈ F OWF∧PI , and a number it holds that f ρ , C, ∈ R OWF∧PI if and only if f ρ , C, ∈ R OWF or f ρ , C, ∈ R PI .
It turns out that padding any log 2 (n)-RP-CRHF to a length-preserving function, yields a function which is both a one-way function and a pseudo-injective function.
Lemma 24 (log 2 (ρ)-RP-CRHF to OWF∧PI). Let h = {h ρ } ρ∈N + be an RP-CRHF that com-
bits, where (ρ) ≥ log 2 (ρ). Then the family {h ρ } ρ∈N + , where
, is a one-way function and a pseudo-injective function.
Proof: By the construction h ρ is always length-preserving and so h implements a pseudoinjective and a one-way function. It is also clear that the construction is uniformly efficiently computable.
As for the security reduction, OWF∧PI-breaking h implies either inverting h on a uniformly random input, or finding a collision for one, for infinitely many security parameters ρ. This implies that for infinitely many security parameters ρ it is possible to break at least one of the properties.
First observe that any breaker B that breaks the pseudo-injectivity of h immediately leads to one that RP-CRHF-breaks h with the same probability: On input v ∈ {0, 1} m return the output of B (h (v )) = B(h(v) 0 (ρ) ).
On the other hand, if B OWF-breaks h , we have that B inverts h for infinitely many ρ's. We show that in this case, the algorithm, that on input v ∈ {0, 1} m(ρ) returns B(h ρ (v)), is the required reduction.
By our assumption B inverts h on a random input with probability at least 1 p , where p is a polynomial, for infinitely many security parameters. As h ρ compresses at least log 2 (ρ) bits, we have that for a random v, the probability that h ρ (v) has only one preimage is at most 2 − log 2 (ρ) .
Therefore, with probability at least
2p(ρ) (for sufficiently large ρ) we have that B inverts h ρ (v) and that h ρ (v) has at least two preimages, in which case v is still uniform among h −1 ρ (h ρ (v)). Conitioned on this event it holds that with probability at least 1 2 B returns a v = v that collides with v. Therefore we conclude that the reduction finds a random collision with probability at least 1 4·p(ρ) for all sufficiently large ρ. The composition of the constructions depicted in Lemmas 20, 22 and 24 establishes a fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of an h ∈ F OWF∧PI from any h ∈ F UOWHF that makes log 2 (ρ) calls to the underlying UOWHF. The security reduction makes log 2 (ρ) calls (to both its oracles) in order to break the security of the underlying UOWHF, and if B (OWF∧PI, 1 p )-breaks the constructed h for some polynomial p and breaker B, then the reduction (UOWHF, 1 p )-breaks h, where p is a different polynomial such that p (ρ) > 4·p(ρ)·log 2 (ρ). Thus we obtain:
Corollary 25. Suppose that (G, R) is an s -weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of UOWHF from OWF that makes at most r = r (ρ) queries to OWF. Then there exists an s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of OWF∧PI from OWF that makes r (ρ) · log 2 (ρ) calls to the underlying one-way function, where s(ρ)
Proof: The composition of G with the constructions described in Lemmas 20, 22 and 24 implements a fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of an h ∈ F OWF∧PI from any h ∈ F OWF . The composition of the reduction algorithms described in the lemmas with the s -non-uniform reduction makes at most s calls to both its oracles. It follows that for every B that OWF∧PI-breaks the constructed h , the reduction R [B,h] (OWF, 1 s(ρ) )-breaks h. 11 Therefore, in order to show that there is no s -weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of UOWHF from OWF, where the construction makes r calls to the one-way functions, it is sufficient to show that there is no s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of OWF∧PI from OWF that makes r calls, where s(ρ) def = s (ρ) · log 2 (ρ) and r(ρ) def = r (ρ) · log 2 (ρ). This is the goal of the next section.
11 Note that for a large enough security parameter it still holds that it inverts h with probability
, however, as each query in the reduction algorithm of the assumed s-weak construction results in up to log 2 (ρ) queries to the composed one, we get a total number of at most s queries. As explained, a lower bound on a construction of OWF∧PI from OWF yields a very good (up to a log 2 -factor) bound on the construction of UOWHF. Our proof utilizes the machinery from Section 3. Let us introduce some notation. For an (n, n)-oracle circuit g (?) : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m , a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a value v ∈ {0, 1} m , denote by X g (f, v) and Y g (f, v) the sets of queries and answers made to and received from f during the evaluation of g (f ) (v), respectively.
For any potential construction (G, R) denote by r = r(ρ) the number of queries g ρ makes when instantiated for security parameter ρ with a one-way function f ρ : {0, 1} ρ → {0, 1} ρ , that is we set n(ρ) Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the construction g makes exactly r(ρ)
2000·log(s(ρ)) different queries. Whenever this is not the case, it is always possible to amend G so that it behaves exactly as before, but on input (1 ρ , n, n ) it outputs an (n, n )-oracle circuit with r(ρ) oracle gates, and additionally, all queries are different.
Let s and r be a pair of security functions such that s is super-polynomial, that is, for every polynomial p and large enough ρ it holds that s(ρ) > p(ρ), and that r(ρ) = n(ρ) 2000·log(s(ρ)) holds for all sufficiently large ρ.
We now explain how to construct the oracle O = {O ρ } ρ∈N + and the collection of sets of functions F = {F ρ } ρ∈N + . For each security paramter ρ we define the oracle O ρ and the set F ρ independently of the oracles and function sets chosen for other security parameters. It will always hold that F ρ ⊂ {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and so the constructed F is contained in F OWF .
Therefore, from now on we omit the security parameter in our notation, but formally all our parameters depend on the security parameter ρ. In particular, g (?) is the construction that the uniform construction algorithm G outputs for security parameter ρ = n = n with a function f ρ : {0, 1} ρ → {0, 1} ρ .
Analogously to [HS12] , for every security parameter we break either the one-wayness property of the constructed function, or its pseudo-injectivity. For the oracle circuit g (?) : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m , we check whether when g is evaluated with a random permutation f r ← P n and a random input v r ← {0, 1} m , the output g f (v) is significantly correlated with any subset of the set of oracle answers returned by f on the calls made to it during the evaluation of g f (v) (recall that these are denoted by Y g (f, v) ). To this end, we bring the procedure STA (for safe to answer), which returns true if and only if there is no such correlation:
Procedure STA(w, Q) (on w ∈ {0, 1} m and Q ⊂ {0, 1} n of size r)
return false return true
We set p(g), the probability that for a random permutation f and a random input v, the output g f (v) is correlated with some subset of the answers
We stress that both the output of STA (for any value y and a set Q), and the value p(g) do not depend on any specific permutation, but rather on a combinatorial property of the construction as a whole, which averages over all permutations.
As explained, we set the oracle O and the set F based on the value p(g). In case that
n , where we use the oracle BreakOW g from [HS12] , which is described next. In [HS12] it is implicitly proved that there exists a set F ⊂ P n of size |F| > |Pn| 5 , such that BreakOW g,f (OWF, 1 4 )-breaks g f for all f ∈ F, and that BreakOW g is 2 n 5 -stable for F, in which case condition (2) in Theorem 18 is satisfied.
2 we show that when f is chosen uniformly at random from a set of regular degenerate functions, it is often the case that the construction g (f ) is not injective, and therefore there exists an oracle which breaks the pseudo-injectivity of g (f ) . The challenge is to find a breaker oracle that is t-stable. The next lemmas establish that the oracle BreakPI satisfies the required conditions in this case.
Formally, for a construction circuit g we define the oracle BreakPI g = {BreakPI g,f } f ∈{0,1} n →{0,1} n that for a function f is given by:
for which (8) holds. We show that in this case BreakPI g,f returns a collision with probability at least 1 30 for a randomly chosen v.
Equation (8) 
, which asserts the claim. Finally, for any w ∈ W f , we claim that
Conditioned on g (f ) (v) = w, we have that v is still uniform among (g (f ) ) −1 (w). Now, recall that BreakPI g,f fails to return a collision only when v is such that Y g (f, v) differs from the sets
Therefore, BreakPI g,f (v) fails for at most 2 n 200 of the elements of (g (f ) ) −1 (w), as for at most 2 n 200 − 1 of them it can be the case that there is no other v for which
n 100 and so BreakPI g,f = ⊥ with probability at least 1 2 . The claim follows. Combining our claims we obtain:
The lemma follows.
We conclude from Lemma 27 that if p(g) ≤ 1 2 , there exists a partition P of {0, 1} n to sets of size 2 n−i and an image-set I of size 2 i , such that (5) holds for at least a 1 6 -fraction of the functions f ∈ R n,i (P, I). Set F ⊂ R n,i (P, I) to be the set of all functions for which (5) holds. It follows that |F| ≥ 1 6 · 2 i , as |R n,i (P, I)| = |P i |. We next show that that for the class of functions R n,i (P, I) the oracle can be implemented such that it is stable. Lemma 28. Let i ∈ N + and I ⊂ {0, 1} n of size 2 i and P a partition of {0, 1} n to sets of size 2 n−i . Then there exists an implementation of the oracle BreakPI g that is n-stable for R n,i (P, I).
Proof: As we show next, when we limit the oracle to a fixed partition P and a fixed image I, it can be implemented such that it makes only few queries to f on every call to BreakPI and therefore enjoys stable sets.
We begin by describing the parsimonious implementation of the algorithm, i.e., an implementation that makes very few queries to f .
The parsimonious algorithm will have a description of the partition P and the image mapping I. On input v it simulates BreakPI g as follows: In every iteration the BreakPI g queries only g (f ) (v). The algorithm records action of the f on the inputs of X g (f, v). That is, it records the values of h[f ] on π P (X g (f, v) ).
It then tries to emulate the value g (f ) (v ) while assuming that f is in R n,i (P, I). Whenever g f (v ) issues a query x, the algorithm checks whether it is mapped under the partition function π P to the same value as one of the x queries issued before. I.e., it checks whether π P (x) = π P (x ) for some x ∈ X g (P, I). In such a case it uses the recorded value of f (x ) and the emulation continues. If the algorithm gets stuck it decides that Y g (f, v) = Y g (f, v ) and continues to the next iteration. We first note that the algorithm is well defined for all f ∈ F n,i (P, I).
Next, we observe that for a function f ∈ R n,i (P, I) the parsimonious algorithm simulates BreakPI g perfectly: If for some value v the evaluation of g (f ) (v ) gets stuck on some query x, we know that the output would not return the value v since in this case the function h[f ] is a permutation and r I is injective it holds that f (x) / ∈ Y g (f, v). On the other hand, when the simulation of an iteration succeeds it follows that for every x it holds that f (x) is computed correctly (and accordingly g (f ) (v) and Y g (f, v )). Again, this follows from the decomposition
We note that the algorithm is not guranteed to behave the same as BreakPI g for an arbitrary f ∈ F n,i (P, I), but we only care about its behavior for a regular f . It is now immediate that the implementation is r-stable: In a similar manner to the case of the evaluation oracle we set
as determining and bending sets for BreakPI, respectively.
It is left to check that 2 s · d i (s, n) < |F|. We compute
where
since s > 3 · n 2 for sufficiently large n. Combining (11) with (12) we conclude that
We have shown that the conditions of Theorem 18 hold, and therefore we conclude that there is no s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of OWF∧PI from OWF. The theorem is proved.
Deriving the Lower Bound
We are now ready to derive our lower bound for constructions of a universal one-way hash function from a one-way function:
Corollary 29. Let s be a security function such that s(n) def = s (n)·log 2 (n) is a super-polynomial security function for which s(n) < 2 n 10 holds. Then there is no s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of UOWHF from OWF, where the construction makes at most r (n) = n 2000·log(s(n))·log 2 (n)
calls to a one-way function f = {f n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n } n∈N + .
Proof:
We apply Corollary 25 with Theorem 26.
Corollary 30. There is no fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of UOWHF from OWF, where the construction makes at most r = r(n) calls to a one-way function f = {f n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n } n∈N + , where r ∈ o n log 3 (n)
.
Proof: Let r ∈ o n log 3 (n)
. Then there exists a super-constant function α = α(n), such that the function r (n) given by r (n) def = r(n) · α(n) is still in o n log 3 (n)
. The bound follows immediately from Corollary 29 applied with s(n) def = 2 α(n)·log(n) .
5 A Tight Lower-Bound for Fully Black-Box Constructions of UOWHF from OWF.
Corollary 30 establishes a lower bound of Ω(n/ log 3 (n)) calls for any fully black-box construction of UOWHF from a OWF. We now explain how to improve the lower-bound by a log(n) factor.
Recall that the choice of log 2 (ρ) in Lemma 24 was made such that any breaker for OWF∧PI can be translated to one that breaks the security of the RP-CRHF, i.e., finds a collision for a random preimage. We observe that the lemma is still correct if we start with a (ρ)-RP-CRHF, for any super-logarithmic function (ρ) ∈ ω(log(ρ)). That is, a compression by a super-logarithmic number of bits is sufficient for our proof to go through. In this case (as in the proof of Lemma 24) it still follows that at most a negligible fraction of the inputs have at most one preimage, and therefore the reduction converts a breaker with noticeable success probability for OWF∧PI is converted to a breaker with a noticeable success probability for (ρ)-RP-CRHF. Next, this improves Corollary 25 by a log(ρ) factor, which consequently improves our bound to Ω(n/ log 2 (n)) calls.
A Tight Lower-Bound for the Construction of a log(ρ)-UOWHF
Using the analysis of the construction presented in [BM12] , we get a construction that makes O(log(n)/n) queries from a one-way function from this class of functions. That is, when considering constructions of UOWHF from OWF there is a gap of a log(n) factor.
The construction in [BM12] offers an approach to explain this gap. Namely, it yields a universal one-way hash function that compresses log(n) bits and not just one bit. Therefore, when considering the construction of a log(ρ)-UOWHF from OWF and using the analysis presented in the previous section (Section 5) it follows that we need only ω(1) calls to a log(ρ)-UOWHF to get a PI∧OWF (as explained before), in which case our bound improves to Ω(n/ log(n)) calls. That is, when considering construction of UOWHFs that compress O(log(n)) bits we already get a tight lower bound. Recall that even for constructions of log(n)-UOWHF the lower-bound presented in [GGKT05] is trivial (i.e., instantiating their bound for k = log(n) we get a lower-bound of one call to the OWF.
A Tight Lower-Bound of Ω(n/ log(n)) Calls
In this section we present the most general version of our lower-bound. We consider once more the series of reductions used to derive Corollary 25. We show that it is possible to get rid of the last log(n) factor used in Lemma 24, which in turn results in a lower-bound of Ω(n/ log(n)) calls.
We do not know of a reduction that transforms a breaker with an inverse polynomial success probability of a OWF∧PI to a breaker with an inverse polynomial success probability for O(1)-RP-CRHF (i.e., a UOWHF that compresses a constant number of bits). Nevertheless, we can exploit the fact that both breakers presented in Section 4 perform better than merely breaking the primitive. That is, in order to derive the lower-bound using Corollary 25 it is sufficient that the breaker in Theorem 26 breaks (with some inverse-polynomial probability). However, both BreakPI and BreakOW enjoy a stronger property: They both break the security of the OWF∧PI with constant probability (both break the candidate construction with probability at least 1/100) rather than with inverse-polynomial probability.
We observe that in this case the reduction algorithm presented in Lemma 24 gives a breaker with a constant success probability for (ρ)-RP-CRHF, where (ρ) = 10. Following the analysis in Lemma 24 we have that at most a 2 −10 -fraction of the images have only one preimage, and using the union-bound the reduction breaks the (ρ)-RP-CRHF with probability at least 1/100−1/2 10 > 1/200. In a similar manner to Section 5 this gives now a version of Corollary 25, that asserts the existence of an s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of OWF∧PI from OWF for breakers that are considered successful only if they break the security property of the OWF∧PI with constant probability:
Corollary 31. Suppose that (G, R) is an s -weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of UOWHF from OWF that makes at most r = r (ρ) queries to OWF. Then there exists an s-weak fixed-parameter fully black-box construction of OWF∧PI from OWF that makes 10·r (ρ) calls to the underlying one-way function, where s(ρ) def = 10 · s (ρ) and additionally, a potential breaker for OWF∧PI is successful only if it breaks the security if property of the primitive with probability at least 1/100.
We stress that the restriction with respect to the constant success probability of the potential breaker in the corollary does not propagate to the constructions we rule out, and our lower-bound holds with respect to the 'standard' (polynomial) security requirements. Applying Corollary 31 with Theorem 26 we derive a lower-bound of Ω(n/ log(n)) calls for a fully black-box construction of a UOWHF from a OWF in the conditions of Corollaries 29 and 30.
